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Summary findings
Bartel and Harrison compare the performance of public  shielded from import competition performed worse than
and private sector manufacturing firms in Indonesia for  private enterprises.
1981-95.  They analyze whether public sector  Ownership matters. For a given level of import
inefficiency is due primarily to agency-type problems  competition or soft loans, public enterprises perform
("ownership") or to the business environment in which  worse than their counterparts  in the private sector.
public enterprises operate, as measured by soft budget  Eliminating soft loans to Indonesia's public enterprises
constraints or barriers to competition.  would raise total factor productivity by 6 percentage
They nest the two alternatives in a production  function  points; the same result could be achieved by increasing
framework.  import penetration by 15 percentage points.
The results, obtained from fixed-effects specifications,  Bartel and Harrison show that these findings are not
provide support for both models.  due to selection effects for either privatization or the
The business environment matters. Only public  receipt of soft loans.
enterprises that received loans from state banks or those
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on this project."The argument for privatizing the corporation, of course, is that private owners, driven by the
profit incentive, will operate the company more efficiently."
-- Louis Uchitelle, The New York Times, May 31, 1998.
"Few privatized companies have become more efficient or profitable".
-- Venyamin Sokolov on Russia, The New York Times, June 1, 1998.
Why privatize?  One primary objective of privatization is to enhance the efficiency of
public enterprises. This is the perspective put forth by Louis Uchitelle in an interview with
Joseph Stiglitz in the May 1998 New York Times.  One day later, an editoral by the director of
Russia's General Accounting Office appeared, pointing out that very few of Russia's privatized
firms have actually increased efficiency.  Clearly, the evidence to date on the superior
performance of privatized plants is incomplete.  Megginson et al.(l 994) conclude their review of
the evidence by stating that the wave of privatizations carried out over the last decade were based
on blind faith.  Laffont and Tirole, in their (1993) book, echo that point, remarking that "the
empirical literature on the relative efficiency of the two ownership structures is itself currently
inconclusive".  Although many studies find that public sector plants perform poorly relative to
their private sector counterparts (Boardman and Vining (1989), Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley
(1992), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1997)), other studies get mixed or ambigious results
(Funkhouser and MacAvoy (1979), Groves, Hong, McMillan and Naughton (1994)).
One explanation for the conflicting evidence is that the efficiency gains from
privatization depend on a variety of factors, including the degree of competition. the regulatoryenvironment, the magnitude of market failure, and the administrative capabilities of the
government.  These are the conclusions reached by Vickers and Yarrow (1991) in their lengthy
review of the arguments for and against privatization. '  One recent article which provides a
formal argument for this view is Shleifer and Vishny (1994).  They present a model of bargaining
between politicians and managers and show that privatization enhances efficiency only if
"control rights" over employment decisions are shifted to the plant manager and government
subsidies are targeted at inefficient public plants.  This perspective focuses on the environment
in attempting to explain the performance of public and private enterprises.
Others, however, argue that private sector ownership is always inferior to public sector
ownership, even after controlling for differences in the environment.  These types of arguments,
as illustrated by Ehrlich et al (1994), are often based on some variant of a principal agent
problem: the principal (the government) either cannot or does not choose to properly monitor the
managers.  This approach focuses on ownership as the explanation for poor public sector
performance. 2
Despite these different perspectives, the empirical studies on privatization have typically
focused on identifying the magnitude of the gains, rather than attempting to identify their
'Recent  evidence  provides  support  for this view. The November  3, 1998  issue  of  The Financial  Times  reports
that the Jamaican  government  retook control  of the three largest  sugar mills,  which had  been privatized  four years
earlier. The government  claimed  that  the mills  had "not met  productivity  and production  targets  and have depended
too heavily  on state support".  The March 11, 1998  issue  of The New York Times  reports  that the Argentinian
government  has eliminated  the duopoly  maintained  by its two telephone  companies,  pointing  out that since  the
' 1990  privatization,  the two  companies  have  increased  the number  of lines in the country  from three  million  to
seven  million,  but their monopolies  have  kept Argentine  telephone  phone rates  high by international  standards".
2The  importance  of the principal-agent  problem  is also demonstrated  by Gertner,  Scharfstein  and Stein  (1994)
who show  how an internal  capital  market  where  corporate  headquarters  owns the business  units to which it allocates
capital  leads  to more  monitoring  compared  to the situation  of external financing  where  the bank does not own  the
firms  to which  it lends. Hubbard  and Palia  (1999)  use the internal  capital market  hypothesis  to explain  why bidding
firms earned  positive  abnormal  returns  in  diversiffying  acquisitions  in the 1960s.
2sources. Recent papers (Megginson et al (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998)) compare
performance in a set of enterprises before and after privatization, but do not control for the
conditions under which privatization occurred. From a policy perspective, however, it is critical
to be able to identify the determinants of improved performance with privatization.  For example,
if public sector enterprises perform poorly because they are located in sectors with very little
internal or external competition, or because of access to soft loans, then public sector plants
could be induced to behave like the private sector in a competitive, subsidy-free environment.
These considerations become critical if privatization has been delayed or is not politically
feasible in the short run.
One recent paper (LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997) does examine the sources of
public sector inefficiency. Using data for all 218 non-financial privatizations that took place in
Mexico between 1983 and 1991, LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes decompose the post-privatization
improvement in the ratio of operating income to sales and show that 10 percent is due to higher
product prices, 33 percent to transfers from laid-off workers and the remaining 57 percent to
productivity gains.  But their analysis does not focus primarily on why these improvements in
performance occurred.
In this paper, we focus on the role of ownership versus the environment and attempt to
assign a relative weight to these two explanations for poor public sector behavior. 3 Although
many regulatory aspects cannot be adequately captured in our empirical work, we do measure
31n  contrasting  the roles of ownership  and environment  we do not distinguish  between  different  types of owners
post-privatization,  i.e. our focus is on private  vs. public  owners. Barberis et.al. (1996) study  the restructuring  that
occurred  in privatized  Russian  shops when  there  were new owners  and new managers  compared  to giving  equity  to
the old managers.
.3two important environrmental  factors: (1) the role of soft budget constraints 4 and (2) the degree of
internal and external competition.
Recent empirical work by Pinto and Van Wijnbergen (1995),  Claessens and Djankov
(1997) and others studies the effect of soft loans on performance, but, due to data limitations,
does not fully address the issue of ownership versus environment.  Pinto and Van Wijnbergen
(1995) focus only on public sector enterprises, making public-private comparisons impossible.
The study by Claessens and Djankov (1997) uses data on the Czech Republic for only the early
1990s when information on ownership changes was limited.  In addition, data for the Czech
Republic does not differentiate between soft loans and overall bank lending.  Since virtually all
firms in the Czech Republic received bank loans, this makes it difficult to test for the impact of
soft loans there.
To identify the sources of public sector inefficiency, we use a 1981-1995 panel of all
public and private enterprises in manufacturing in Indonesia. Our results suggest that the
observed inferior perforrnance of public sector enterprises (PSEs)  is attributable to both
ownership and the environment. The environment matters because only PSEs which received
loans from state banks or those shielded from import competition performed worse than private
enterprises. Ownership matters because, for a given level of import competition or soft loans,
PSEs perform worse than their private sector counterparts.  Eliminating soft loans to public
enterprises in Indonesia would raise total factor productivity levels by 6 percentage points; the
same result could be achieved by increasing import penetration by 15 percentage points.
4Research  on the impact  of the soft budget  constraint  goes  back to Kornai  (1979), who first postulated  that the
possibility  of bail-outs  for public  sector enterprises  could be used  to explain  their poor performance.
4Section II reviews a number of hypotheses regarding public sector efficiency and sets up
the empirical framework for the paper.  In Section III the Indonesian data are described and
results are presented in Section IV.  Section V concludes.
II. Theoretical Background and Empirical Implementation
A. Theoretical Background
Although there have been many articles written on the benefits and costs of privatization,
two articles provide the theoretical motivation for our work. The first is a paper by Shleifer and
Vishny (1994) which presents a model of bargaining between politicians and managers and
shows the conditions under which privatization will lead to increased productivity.  Shleifer and
Vishny (1994) argue that governnent  officials are willing to subsidize public enterprises only to
the extent that they hire workers beyond the profit-maximizing level.  Public enterprises are
granted subsidies in return for promising to hire too many workers.  There is a direct negative
link between government transfers and plant productivity, since government officials "pay"
enterprise managers to hire too many workers.
In this framework, privatization is defined as shifting control over "cash flow" to the
enterprise.  However, by placing the firm's equity in private hands, the government does not
necessarily relinquish control over hiring decisions. This type of control is referred to as "control
rights".  The authors show that privatization alone need not lead to any increases in efficiency (ie
a reduction in excess workers). In fact, privatization could be associated with falling efficiency if
politicians retain control rights.  This would be the case for a regulated firm, where cash flow is
privatized but control rights remain with the government.
5The second article that provides a theoretical framework for our empirical work is Ehrlich
et.al. (1994).  In their model, the level of total factor productivity is a function of managerial time
allocated to current production, while the rate of total factor productivity growth is positively
related to the manager's commitment to investments in plant-specific capital.  Public sector
managers, according to their model, spend too much time pursuing independent private
objectives.  This has two effects: it reduces the time spent building plant-specific capital (which
raises TFP growth in the long run) and it has an ambiguous effect on the time spent monitoring
current production which impacts the current level of TFP.  This framework implies that there is
no reason why levels of productivity in public sector plants should be lower than in the private
sector in the short run, but it does imply a lower rate of productivity growth for public sector
enterprises.  In the longer term, of course, lower public sector productivity growth should
eventually lead to lower productivity levels than in the private sector.  One insight provided by
this model is that it can explain why PSEs could survive in the medium term even in a
competitive environment.  If the most efficient enterprises were taken over by the government
initially-as appears to have been the case in Indonesia-than  the myopia of these managers does
not immediately translate into lower efficiency levels.
Ehrlich et al (1994) is typical of most work that addresses the issue of public versus
private efficiency: public enterprises are assumed to be less efficient in the long run because the
managers fail to act in a way that maximizes long run profits.  Although Ehrlich et al do not say
why, one reason could be imperfect monitoring by the government.  The Ehrlich et. al. paper is
one illustration of a wider literature which argues that public sector enterprises are more
inefficient primarily due to principal agent problems.  One implication is that there should be a
6consistent negative coefficient on public ownership in any comparisons of productivity growth.
Shleifer and Vishny (1994), on the other hand, argue that ownership changes by themselves are
generally not associated with any change in performance. According to this alternative
framework, it is the environment which determines the comparative performance of the two types
of enterprises.
B. Measuring Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
As our yardstick of relative performance, we focus exclusively on total factor
productivity (TFP), at least in part because prior research (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997)
has shown that a very large part of the gains from privatization is due to productivity growth. We
begin with a general discussion of the problems involved in production function estimation, and
then discuss in turn how to introduce the role of soft budgets and ownership.  A general
production function for plant i in sector j at time t is given by equation (1):
Y,j, = A1 ,,F(Z4)  (1)
Output Yl,,  is a real measure of plant-level output and Z is a vector of M inputs.  In our estimation,
we will include as inputs both skilled and unskilled labor, capital inputs, and materials. A,, is a
plant-specific index of Hicks-neutral technical progress which will depend on a number of
factors, including ownership.  Totally differentiating (1), and dividing through by Y,  we have
dY/Y.e,  Em  (aYlaZm)(dZm/Y),jt  +dA/A .,  (2)
7In this framework, imperfect competition enters (2) because plants with market power do
not set the value marginal product P(6Y/JZ) equal to the factor price. If we assume Cournot
behavior by imperfectly competitive plants, then we can derive the first order conditions from
each plant's profit maximization and write each of the partial derivatives oY'&Z:
(HlaZm)U= (w  lp)>j  [  1  +S  ] =  (Wm/lp)j,  tI  (3)
1 +  (S/ ej)
S is the ith plant's share in the jth industry, while e is the elasticity of demand.  Factor prices for
input m are given by win. If plant i is not perfectly competitive, then the value of the marginal
product exceeds the factor cost by some mark-up ,u. For simplicity, we will assume that the
mark-up parameter does not vary across plants or over time.
Substituting (3) into (2) and rearranging terms, we have
dY/Y.~  =  I4j  Lm  [WZ  Z(4
/iy jEm  [wMZm/PY  Z 7'I  +  (d,4A/)Y,(4
The value of w,nZm/PY  is the share of the mth factor in total output. We shall denote this share as
Bi.  Rewriting (4),
dlnY y, = dlnA  Y,  +  TuE.=I.oMBBdlnZm,J,  (5)
8All variables have been rewritten in log forn.  Output growth can be decomposed into
two sources: growth in productivity, or growth in input use.  In a regression framework, the
coefficients on the M inputs include two components: the mark-up pararneter ,u, and the factor
share.  By not constraining the coefficients, we allow both factor shares and mark-ups to vary.
To simplify the presentation, we will now omit subscripts in most of the discussion which
follows.
C.Introducing the Soft Budget Constraint
To introduce the importance of the soft budget constraint, we draw from the intuition
provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1994).  In their model, politicians and managers bargain over
the level of employment in the firm.  Politicians offer managers some amount of transfer, T, to
induce them to hire extra labor. Shleifer and Vishny assume that this excess labor produces no
extra output. This means that there is a direct link between T and lower productivity: firms
which take more T and consequently hire more excess labor will have lower productivity.  Our
goal is to capture this effect empirically.
Consistent with their framework, we can assume that there are two types of labor:
necessary labor (NL) and excess labor (EL). If EL is included with other labor inputs, estimation
of the production function will show that firms with more EL have lower productivity growth.
To the extent that firms with EL also tend to be public sector enterprises, we could conclude that
public sector enterprises are more inefficient.  If we can isolate labor inputs (EL) which are tied
to transfers, however, then we can separate the impact of ownership from the soft budget
constraint on productivity.
Unfortunately, however, we do not observe EL and NL separately. If we isolate labor
9inputs from other inputs, we can rewrite equation (5) as follows:
dln(Y) = dlnA  +  .UBNAFldln(NL + EL) + E., 2boM4Bm1dln(Z,)  (6)
We only observe total labor inputs, given by the sum of NL and EL, as well as the total share of
labor, given by BNL-EL.  Suppose we could isolate necessary from excess labor.  Then we could
define "true" TFPG, which is the residual d1nA, as:
dmnAtrue  = TFPGtrue  = dln(Y) - PtBNLdln(NL)  - Xm 2to,A.M  uBmdln(Z,)  (7)
However, since the plant has employees who do nothing, observed TFPG will in fact be lower:
dnA  observed  =  TFPGobserved  = dlnY)  - UBA,  kld1n(NL  -+ EL) - E.  uBmdln(Z,r)  (7)'
If we assume that necessary and unnecessary labor are paid the same wage, simple algebra shows
that the difference between (7) and (7)' is given by the following:
TFPGobserved =  TFPGtrue  - 1UBv  (-E,dEL/(NL  + EL)]
Observed TFPG for plants receiving transfers has two components--the component which
measures actual technological change in the plant, and the component attributed to excess labor.
So observed TFPG in plants which receive transfers will always be lower, due to the negative
10contribution of excess labor. Ideally, we would like to be able estimate both true productivity
growth, dlnAt1,.e,  as well as the contribution due to hiring excess labor.  We can do this by
estimating equation (8):
dln(Y)  = dlnAtrue  +  IUBNL ELdln(NL+EL)  + Em= 2 oMIfBmdIln(Zm)  -IU'kL,L-dEJL  NL+EL)}
=  dlnAl,ue  +  m=1t,oM.Bmdl1n(Zm)  -,u-EPNL.AL(dEL/(NL+EL))  (8)
We can now directly estimate the negative contribution of excess labor inputs to observed TFPG,
which is captured by  iBNL+EL{dEL/(NL  + EL)}.  However, since EL is unobserved, we need a
proxy for the change in the amount of "excess" labor. To derive an expression for excess labor,
we modify the model outlined by Shleifer and Vishny in their 1994 QJE article (hereafter
referred to as SV).  Politicians use government funds, which in their model are labelled as
transfers T, to get managers to hire more employees than is necessary. These excess employees
are labeled EL and are paid a (real) wage w.  Politicians maximize a utility function equal to the
benefits from providing more jobs (B(EL)) less the costs of providing these transfers (C(T)), plus
any bribes b they may receive for giving funds T to a particular firm.  Managers, on the other
hand maximize utility equal to  (X-+  T - wL)-b, where  7t is profits.  In their paper,  SV assume
that managers only care about the percentage of firm returns that are privately owned, so
managers maximize a (Xt+  T - wL)-b, where a is the % of the firm which is privately owned.  We
simplify the analysis in order to provide a clear separation between the roles of ownership and
the environment.  However, an extension to the model to make it consistent with the original SV
11framework is provided in footnote 5.
SV assume that managers and politicians bargain over EL and T in a Nash bargaining
framework.  SV also allow for (endogenously determined) bribes.  The model is static.  To make
the model empirically tractable, we assume that T and b are predetermined, and that the
managers and politicians only bargain over excess employment, EL.  We will show that some
key insights from the SV article continue to hold.
If bargaining breaks down, we assume that politicians receive their disagreement utility,
U.', and managers receive their disagreement utility UoM.  Under Nash bargaining, the two
players maximize over EL the product:
(B(EL)  - C(T)  + b - UOP)(n+  T - wEL-  b - UO M)
If we assume a functional form for B(EL) = BwEL and C(T) = CT, then the first order conditions
from maximizing the above product can be rearranged to yield the following expression for wEL:
wEL  = 1/2in  + T(C/B+ 1) - b(1 + I/B) - Uo M +  UOP/B}  (9)
The expenditure on redundant or "excess" employees is positively correlated with firm
profits, government transfers and the politician's disagreement utility. but negatively correlated
with bribes and the manager's disagreement utility. In Section IV, we provide estimates for
equation (9), using as a proxy for excess labor (wEL) the individual plant's deviation from the
subsector's average expenditure share on labor for that year.
It should be clear from equation (9) that public or private ownership is not the issue here;
what determines excess employment (inefficiency) is the magnitude of transfers, bribes, and
12other factors. In fact, if we introduce ownership into this framework, we get similar results to
SV: privatization can lead to an increase in the use of excess labor (a decline in efficiency). 5
SV also focus on the issue of control rights.  In this context, control rights refer to who
controls employment decisions if bargaining breaks down.  Shifting control rights from the
manager to the politician (and vice versa) changes the threat points and consequently the
outcome of the bargaining game.  We can show that in our simplified game, we get the same
qualitative outcome as SV: shifting control rights from the politician to the manager reduces
excess employment and raises efficiency. 6
5 To illustrate this point, we can introduce ownership a, which varies between 0 and 1.  SV assume that public
sector managers only derive utility from the percentage of the firm's profits which are privately owned:
UM  = a (T+ T -wL)-b
If we rederive the first order conditions from the Nash bargaining game with a  # I, we get the following:
w(EL) = '/z{i + T(C/B+ 1)  - b(l /a  +-  I  /B) - UoM/a + UDP/B}  (9)'
It is clear from (9)' that privatization (an increase in a  ) will lead to an increase in wEL.  Shifting so-called
cash flow rights to firms lowers efficiency.  The intuition is that increasing private ownership raises the utility that
managers derive from plant profits, which weakens their bargaining position and allows the politician to extract
more surplus relative to managers.  SV derive a similar result.  They use this result to argue that privatization-by
which they mean transferring cash flow rights (a becomes 1) to the firm-may have zero or even negative effects on
efficiency.
6We assume that if politicians control excess employment, then if bargaining breaks down they will set EL so
that the utility of the manager. UM, is set equal to zero. The manager will be compensated exactly so that n+ T -
wEL - b = 0.  If, on the other hand, the manager has control rights, we assume that when bargaining breaks down
the manager will hire zero excess labor, get no transfers and give no bribes.  In that case, we get that the utilities at
the threat points are UOM=  z  and  Uo 0 = 0. Under politician control, the outcome of the Nash bargaining game is:
w(EL) = 1/z{n  +  T(C/B+ 1) - b(l  + I/B) + UOP/B}
Under manager control, the outcome of the Nash bargaining game is:
w(EL) = 1/2{ T(C/B+ 1) - b( I  + I/B)  }
As long as profits are non-negative, it is clear that expenditure on excess labor will be higher under
politician control. The different outcomes also provide a way to empirically identify who has control rights: under
manager control, the firm's profits should not affect expenditure on excess labor.
13To incorporate the insights from SV into our framework, we need to combine equation
(8) and equation (9)'.  Equation (9)' states that wEL should be a function of transfers, bribes, the
manager's and politician's  disagreement utilities, and ownership.  A parsimonious representation
of equation (9)' is given by equation (10):
wEL =  (ir,  T,b,  Uo 0 , Uop)  (10)
To combine (10) with (8), we need to replace the expression  NLB+  EL{dEL/(NL  + EL)} in
equation (8)  with (10) above.  It is possible to show that ,uBXL  EL{dEL/(NL  + EL)} can be
rewritten as p[d(c)EL)] as long as the change in the real wage Z  is close to zero.  Combining the
first difference of equation(1 0) with (8) yields the following:
dln(Y)  =  dlnA,rz,e  + Z.  L,Mw,uBmdln(Z,  -pd irn; T,b,Uo 0t  Uo")  (11)
D. Ownership Effects
For clarity, we now redefine public ownership, equal to 1 - a,  as PUB. We also re-
introduce subscripts i for firm i and t for time t.  Following Ehrlich et.al.(1994), we allow A to
have the following components:
Al, = exp(77,PUB,,  f  17 2PUB,,*time  +yX,, +f  + d, + ed)  (12)
The degree of public ownership, PUB, affects both the level and the growth rate of
14productivity. The coefficient on PUB measures the relationship between ownership and the level
of A; the coefficient on PUB*time measures the relationship between ownership and the change
in A. The Ehrlich et.al. (1994) framework implies that the coefficient on PUB is ambiguous,
while the coefficient on PUB*time should be negative.  We also include a vector Xof other
factors which could also affect productivity, and which we will discuss in more detail below.
The framework in equation (12) allows for a plant-specific fixed effect,f,  which reflects fixed
differences across plants which are persistent but unobserved over time, time effects which are
common to plants but which vary over time, d,, and a random unobserved component, e,,.
To take into account the plant-specific effect, we could either include plant dummies in
the estimation or take first-differences. We have chosen to do the latter.  If we log-linearize
equation (12) and transform it into first-differences, combining with (11) yields the following
specification:
dln(Y),,= 77dPUB,,  + 772d(P  UB,,  *time) + ydX, +  ,  I,,,t/2Bmdln(ZZ,,)
-pkd(  T,  b, U 0 M  U 0
1 ),,  +  d, + e,
(13)
In the specification above, ownership enters because it can affect Hicks neutral
productivity growth by directly affecting managerial incentives.  However, to the extent that
ownership can affect the outcome of the game played between politicians and managers over
excess labor, it could also enter our excess labor function.  In Section IV, we begin by testing for
the possibility that the relationship between excess employment and its determinants, as captured
15by equation (10), varies by ownership category.
A number of previous studies, especially the early studies, simply compare efficiency use
across public and private plants of one factor, such as capital or labor. This is equivalent to
estimating (13) in levels with M=1, ignoring the fixed effect, and setting all the y's  and p's as
well as B2 through BM  equal to zero.  Some examples of these studies are Boardman and Vining
(1989), Funkhouser and MacAvoy (1979) and Groves, Hong, McMillan and Naughton (1994).
Ehrlich et al (1994) test for the impact of ownership by estimating a levels equation with
plant fixed effects which includes ownership and the interaction of ownership with time.
Consistent with the predictions of their model, they find a negative and significant coefficient for
the interaction between ownership and time, suggesting that total factor productivity growth  is
slower for public enterprises.  But the coefficient on ownership alone is not robust, suggesting no
clear relationship between TFP levels and public ownership.  However, they ignore the soft
budget constraint.  Consequently, they do not test whether poor public sector performance is
attributable purely to ownership or to the fact that public sector enterprises have access to
subsidized loans.
E. Other Environmental Factors
Total factor productivity growth (dlnA) is likely to be affected by a number of factors
7Boardman  and Vining  (1989) use sales per employee  and sales per asset as measures  of efficiency  and find that
private  enterprises  are more  efficient,  controlling  for assets, number  of employees,  market  share, concentration,
country  and industry.  Funkhouser  and MacAvoy  (1979)  analyze  labor  productivity  and do not control for any other
factors.  They  find  that physical  output  per employee  is higher  private  plants but  sales or value-added  per employee
is lower. Groves,  Hong,  McMillan  and Naughton  (1994) find  that giving Chinese  enterprises  greater  autonomy
(either  by selling  output  outside  state quotas  or retaining  a larger  share of profits) does not lead  to an increase  in
productivity  but increasing  the use of bonuses  as a fraction  of the wage bill and increasing  the use of contract
workers  does.  These results  are consistent  with Shleifer  and Vishny  (1994);  giving  managers  cash  flow rights
without  giving  them  control  rights does not raise productivity  because  politicians  have an incentive  to use
government  transfers  to extract  political  benefits  (excess  employment)  from  the firm.
16which could enter via the vector X.  Public sector enterprises are often established in sectors
where the government seeks to regulate what would have been a natural monopoly. A different
competitive environment is likely to directly affect the efficiency parameter, A (see Nickell,
1996). To the extent that public sector enterprises operate in industries with big entry barriers,
there is an omitted variable which could bias our results.  The direction of the bias will depend
on whether greater internal competition is likely to lead to higher or lower productivity.  As a
proxy for competition, we use the Herfindahl index.  Despite its problems, it is the easiest
measure to construct across industries and over time.
Public sector enterprises are typically located in sectors which receive special protection
from import competition.  Consequently, failing to control for differences in import competition
could lead to the incorrect conclusion that public sector enterprises are more inefficient, if lack of
import competition is correlated with poor performance. To address this possibility, we
constructed measures of import competition at the disaggregated industry level.  Import
penetration could have a direct impact on the Hicks neutral term dlnA, if plants subjected to
import competition are more likely to innovate, use better quality inputs, or learn about better
production techniques.
Finally, we also include in the vector X a dummy variable which identifies stock market
participation at the enterprise level.  Laffont and Tirole (1993) argue that the kinds of problems
that arise when there is separation of ownership and control can be mitigated by stock market
participation. This is because the stock market provides at least a partial disciplining device to
managers through stock prices. However, limited stock market participation, noisy prices, and
different ownership structures can limit the amount of information such participation is likely to
17convey.
III. Data
We apply our framework to the manufacturing sector in Indonesia for the time period
1981-1995. Indonesia has a number of features which make it an interesting country to study.
First, over this time period we are able to observe a trend towards privatization which allows us
to examine the impacts of changes in ownership on enterprise performance.  When Indonesia
became independent in 1945, its constitution provided for government ownership of mineral
resources and other "important" sectors of the economy.  State enterprises were operated by
indigenous Indonesians and the government's infusion of capital into these enterprises was
viewed as a way of providing a counterweight to the Chinese firms that tended to dominate the
private sector. 8 During the early 1980s, the government infused much capital into the state
enterprise sector, facilitating its growth. But, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing into the
early 1990s, a wave of privatizations occurred, 9 so that by 1992, the private sector in Indonesia
became, for the first time, the driving force behind economic growth."  A second feature of the
Indonesian economy during this time period is a significant liberalization of trade in the late
1980s, which provides variation in the variable we use to measure external competition.
The Indonesian dataset that we use is a manufacturing census, which is conducted
annually.  Data are available for 1975 through 1995, but information on financing sources is only
'See Bresnan  (1993),  p. 253.
9The  Fourth  Five-Year  Plan, announced  in early 1984,  called  for an increased  role for the private  sector.  Bresnan
(1993),  p.254.
"Bresnan  (1993),  p. 264.
18available beginning in 1981. The number of observations ranges from 6,258 in 1982 to over
12,904 in 1995. The dataset includes information on output, the number of skilled and unskilled
workers, investment, material inputs, compensation, ownership, location, age and financing
sources. Pitt and Lee (1981) used this dataset for the 1972-75 time period to study the impact of
foreign ownership on the productivity of weaving firms.  Goeltom (1995) used the 1981-88
census data to study the impact of financial liberalization on efficiency in the manufacturing
sector. We know of no attempt to use the Indonesian census to examine the relationship between
public ownership and the soft budget constraint.
Data from the Indonesian census were merged with import and export data collected by
the United Nations.  Since the United Nations trade data (as made available to the World Bank),
is available on an ISIC basis, it was possible to merge the two databases by three-digit ISIC. The
United Nations data included information on both net exports and imports by ISIC.  Import
penetration (MPEN) was defined as imports divided by domestic production plus imports less
exports.  Domestic production was calculated by adding up enterprise-level production from the
Census to the three-digit level.  To avoid possibility endogeneity problems, we lagged MPEN
one period.  This variable is only available through 1993.
According to the framework developed in Section II, public sector firms which receive
more financing from the government will exhibit lower productivity due to the hiring of
unnecessary workers.  We will proxy for transfers T using the share of the plant's investments
that are financed by government loans (GLOAN). One limitation of this variable is that it only
measures loans from the government and does not measure the transfer of government funds to
19public sector plants through direct grants or subsidies."  However, anecdotal evidence suggests
that government loans have a large subsidy component, and that many of these loans are never
repaid at all. Another problem is that government loans may be endogeneous.  If, for example,
government loans are simply extended to the weakest enterprises, then equation (13) could lead
to a negative and significant coefficient on GLOAN.  Since our goal is to identify the
independent effects of a soft budget constraint on performance, we also provide instrumental
variable estimates of the impacts of GLOAN on performance.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics from the Indonesian manufacturing census that
compare the characteristics of private and public establishments. A private establishment is
defined as one with 100 percent private (non-government) equity, while a public enterprise refers
to establishments with any level of central or regional government equity participation.  Table I
shows that between 1981 and 1993 approximately 30 percent of public enterprise investment was
financed by government loans, compared to only 1 to 2 percent for private firms.  Note that by
1995, the share of public enterprise investment financed by government loans had fallen to 23
percent, because of the rise of alternative sources of financing. 12 Over the entire time period
1981-1995, the percentage of government loans measured in rupiah that was allocated to the
public sector was at least 70 percent, and rose to 96 percent by 1995. again as a likely result of
the growth of private banks and the stock exchange.  In the early 1  980s, approximately 30
"This is not a problem  as long  as the share of government  loans in  the total value  of loans and subsidies  is not
correlated  with  the firm's productivity.
'2A series of reforms  between  1988  and 1990  reduced  the barriers  to entry  into the banking  system  and  reduced
the privileges  of state banks. Forty  new domestic  banks  were established  between  1988  and 1990,  and there  was a
dramatic  growth  in the Jakarta  stock exchange,  thereby  providing  new sources  of investment  financing.  See  Bresnan
(1993),  p.265.
20percent of public firms received government loans, but by 1995, only 13 percent were receiving
loans from the government.  Public sector enterprises, which accounted for 13-18 percent of total
manufacturing output over the 1981-95 time period, are twice as old as private firms, at least four
times as large, and have a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled workers.
Table 2 provides information, by industrial sector, on the share of output accounted for by
public enterprises and the percentage of investment financed by government loans in public and
private enterprises. There are significant variations across sectors in the degree of private
competition facing public enterprises.  In some sectors, such as food products, industrial
chemicals, and iron and steel, public enterprises account for a major share of production.  In
many other sectors, such as tobacco, apparel, footwear and professional equipment, public
enterprises account for a small share of overall productive activity. Note that, even within the
public sector, there are variations across industries in the share of investment financed by
government loans.  For example, in the food products industry, 47 percent of investment by
public enterprises is financed by government loans, while in the industrial chemicals industry,
only 22 percent of investment by public enterprises is financed by government loans.
Other Variable Definitions  Equations (1) through (13), described in Section II, provide
the framework for our empirical analysis. The dependent variable. Y, is measured by the real
value of annual output. Inputs include the number of skilled production workers (SKILLED), the
number of unskilled workers (UNSKILLED), the sum of the real value of domestically produced
raw materials, imported raw materials, and energy used (MATERIALS), and the real value of
21investment or capital(CAPITAL). 13 Public ownership is measured by the percentage of equity
owned by the central government or regional governments (PUB). Since public enterprises are
less likely to raise finds  on the stock exchange and firms that raise fumds  on the stock exchange
may be partially disciplined by the information revealed through share prices, we also add a
dummy variable (STOCK) which equals one if the stock exchange is a source of investment
financing for the firm.
Although we have no data on bribes b, we do have data on gifts at the plant level
(GIFTS), which we shall use as a proxy for bribes.  Although we considered using plant-level
reported profits as our measure of It,  to minimize endogeneity problems we instead use as a
proxy for profits two sector-level measures, lagged one period: the herfindahl index (HERF) and
import penetration (MPEN).  Since higher concentration is typically associated with higher
profits, we expect the coefficient on HERF positively affect excess labor and negatively affect
productivity growth. Since higher import competition is typically associated with lower profits,
we expect the coefficient on MPEN to negatively affect excess employment and positively affect
productivity growth.  Both MPEN and HERF are lagged one period to avoid potential
endogeneity problems.  As we discussed in Section III, these variables could also affect
productivity directly via the X vector, rather than operating through their impact on excess labor.
In the SV model, the parties' disagreement points are the utilities each would obtain in
the absence of a negotiated agreement. A party with a high disagreement utility has more
3The  census  data only  reports  the value of the capital  stock beginning  in 1987. In the specifications  that use first
differences,  we have  chosen  to proxy  capital  stock by investment.  By doing this, we are in effect assuming  either
zero depreciation  or that the omitted  term,  lagged  capital  stock multiplied  by the rate of depreciation,  does not
induce  any omitted  variable  bias. In our within  specifications,  this approach is not appropriate  and we therefore
used the perpetual  inventory  method  to estimate  the value  of the capital  stock in  the years  prior to 1987. A flat
depreciation  rate  of 10 percent  was utilized.
22bargaining power and is therefore able to obtain a more favorable negotiated agreement.
Although we do not observe disagreement points in our data. we do have variables which are
likely to be correlated with the disagreement points.  For example, firmns  with foreign equity
participation are likely to have higher disagreement utilities and can therefore bargain from a
stronger position. The variable FOREIGN, the percentage of foreign investment, is therefore
included in the empirical analysis and its interaction with PUB is predicted to have a positive
effect on total factor productivity.  Foreign ownership may also have an independent effect on
productivity since foreign-owned firms are likely to be more efficient than domestically owned
firms." 4 Another variable that we use is JAVA, a dummy variable which indicates whether or
not the plant is located on the main island of Indonesia, since it may be more difficult for
politicians to wield bargaining power against plants that are located in remote regions far from
the country's capital. In addition, on the main island of Java, there may be smaller costs to raising
taxes to finance subsidized loans.  These arguments would predict a negative effect of JAVA on
total factor productivity.
IV. Results
A.  Testing SV: The Relationship between Transfers and Excess Employment
We begin by examining whether there is support for the SV framework, which suggests
that firms which receive subsidized loans "pay" for them by hiring too many employees-which
then shows up as poor productivity growth.  We do this by examining the relationship  between
'4Surprisingly,  Pitt and Lee  (1981) found  that in the 1970s,  Indonesian  weaving firns that were foreign  owned
were less  efficient  than domestically  owned firmns  in the industry.
23excess employment and subsidized loans in the data, then examine the impact of loans on
productivity directly.
Equation (10) suggests that there should be a positive relationship between expenditure
on excess labor EL and transfers T, which we proxy with GLOAN.  Although we do not directly
observe EL, we do observe total expenditure on labor.  Labor expenditure was first normalized
simply by dividing by sales, to give a labor share in sales variable.  However, labor share is not
an appropriate measure for "excess" labor. To capture the idea of excess labor, we divided each
firm's  labor share by the annual mean labor share for each 3-digit manufacturing subsector. This
alternative definition of labor share measures excess labor as the deviation from the sector mean.
Table 3 reports the means for raw labor share, as well as raw labor share normalized by
the sector mean, across public and private ownership.  In column (1), which is restricted to the
enterprises that did not receive government loans, we observe that the public sector enterprises
have a higher share of labor costs in sales relative to private enterprises.  This difference is more
striking after controlling for sector means; private sector enterprises had a mean labor share
which averaged 95 percent of sector means, compared to  109 percent for public sector
enterprises.
According to the theoretical framework, excess labor should be higher in enterprises
which received government support.  The evidence in column (2) is consistent with that
hypothesis for the public sector, but not for the private sector.  Private sector enterprises which
receive government loans hire fewer workers than other private sector enterprises.  This trend is
even stronger for the normalized labor shares, which drop from 95 percent of the industry
average to 80 percent.  For the public sector, however, there is an increase in excess labor, at
24least if labor shares are measured using the normalized shares.  Public sector enterprises which
receive government loans have labor shares in sales which are 14 % above the industry average,
compared to 9 percent above the industry average for public enterprises which do not receive
such loans.
Table 4 presents raw pairwise correlations between changes in government loans and
changes in labor share using both measures of labor shares. The findings show important
differences between public and private enterprises.  For private sector enterprises, there is no
significant correlation between government loans and labor shares, however measured, but for
public sector enterprises, the correlations are significant.  The raw correlation is between 8 and
10 percent and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
The main conclusion from Tables 3 and 4 is that the relationship between government
support and excess labor is quite different across public and private enterprises.' 5 Therefore, we
will modify (10) to allow for different coefficients by ownership class.  The empirical version of
wEL =  (ir,  T,b,  Uo 0 Uf '), modified to allow the coefficients to vary across public and private
owners,  is given  by:
wEL = 6,GLOAN-  62GIFTS + 63HERF  - 64MPEN - 6,5FOR  +  WJA  VA - 67PUB
+ 68  PUB*GLOAN - 69PUB*GIFTS + 6,0PUB*HERF- 65 1PUB*MPEN-  6,2PUB*FOR
+ &J3PUB*JA VA  (10)'
'5It is possible  that government  loans  are used by the private  sector  to hire more  capital  so we do not observe  an
increase  in labor  shares  for the private  firms.  This  explanation  of the observed  difference  between  private  and
public  sector  firms  would  require  the assumption  that  the private  firms are more  capital-constrained  than  the public
firms.
25Transfers are proxied by GLOAN and bribes are captured by GIFTS. Determinants of
profits include  MPEN and HERF.  We attempt to control for firm and politician threat points
with the variables FOR and JAVA. The model suggests that the coefficients on GLOAN and
HERF should be positive.  The coefficients on MPEN, FOR, and GIFTS should be negative
while the coefficient on JAVA should be positive..
The results are reported in Table 5.  The evidence suggests that there is no independent
impact of public ownership per se on the magnitude of excess employment. The effect of public
sector ownership on excess labor operates via government loans.  The interactions between PUB
and GLOAN are positive and significant in every equation in Table 5 while the effect of
government loans for private firms is zero or negative.  Public sector firms which receive
government loans spend more on employees, but this is not the case in the private sector.  In
other words, the SV framework is consistent with public enterprise behavior, but not with
evidence for the private sector.  Privatization matters because public enterprises hire too many
employees in return for government support.  To take into account the fact that the SV model is
only empirically relevant for public sector enterprises, we modify equation (13) by including the
interaction of PUB with all the deterninants of excess labor:
dln(Y),,  =  (f1  +  p
6 -7)  dPUB,, +  7 2d(PUB 1,*time)  +  f  lBmdlfn(Zrnid
- p6,dGLOAN 1, +p62dGIFTS,, - (y,+p&9dHERF., + (y2+p6)dMPEN 1,+p6  dFOR 1, -
p3 6dJA VA  ,,+ y3dSTOCK 1, -p  ,68  d(PUB *GLOAAN)  -p&5 1od(P  UB *HERF)  ,  +
p6c,jd(PUB*MPEN),,+  p6 1 2d(PUB*FOR)  , -p6, 3d(P UB *JA  VA) 1, + d, - er,
(132)
26The results of estimating equation 13' are discussed in the next section.
B.  Effects of Public Ownership and Government Loans - First Difference Fixed
Effects Results
It is problematic to compare productivity levels across plants since there could be a
number of unobserved level effects leading to the observed differences between public and
private enterprises: different prices, hidden subsidies, a different product mix, or a different
regulatory environment. To the extent that these differences are fixed over time, the first
difference specification, equation (13'), eliminates them.  The results of estimating 13' are shown
in columns (1) through (4) of Table 6.
The first difference estimates suggest that the negative effects of public ownership are
concentrated in firms which receive government loans: PUB by itself is not significant but the
interaction of GLOAN and PUB is negative and significant.  According to the estimates in
column (4), a ten percentage point increase in the share of investment funded by government
loans lowers efficiency by.  27 percentage points  for an enterprise with 50 percent public
ownership and by .58 percentage points for a fully public firm. The negative impact of
government support for public enterprises is large in magnitude: moving from zero to full
government financing for a publicly owned enterprise would be associated with a reduction in
total factor productivity levels of 5.8 percentage points. The results in Table 6 provide support
for the argument that a major source of public sector inefficiency is the environment in which
these firms operate.
It is important to point out that GLOAN has no negative, significant impact on the
27operation of private enterprises.  In other words, there may be an agency problem associated with
public sector ownership, but it only "appears" when firms are given access to soft loans or
protected from import competition.  The kind of agency problem modeled by Ehrlich et al (1994)
does not appear to matter: public ownership by itself  has no independent, negative impact on
either productivity levels or productivity growth.
D.  Within Estimation
One serious potential problem with using first-differences to eliminate individual effects
is that first-differences magnify any potential measurement errors in the independent variables
(for a discussion, see Griliches and Hausman (1986)). To the extent that the ownership variables
are measured with error, the insignificant coefficient on ownership in the first-differences
specification could be explained by errors in variables, instead of biases arising from failing to
take into account the plant fixed effect.  Griliches and Hausman (1986) show that under certain
plausible assumptions about serial correlation in the independent variables, the bias due to
measurement error is likely to be less severe under a within than under a first-difference
transformation.  Consequently, we redid our estimation by transforming the dependent and
independent variables into deviations from firm-specific means.  This transformation is not as
attractive as first-differences for a number of reasons. First, the theoretical model allows us to
use a general production function without specifying functional form precisely because it  is
based on a first-difference specification.  Second, we use a constructed capital stock series as
described in footnote 13.
The results of the within estimation are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 and the
28results are virtually identical to the first difference results.  We still find that public ownership by
itself has no independent impact on either productivity levels or productivity growth. But, public
sector enterprises with soft loans perform significantly worse than other enterprises and the point
estimates are consistent with the first differences: according to column (6), eliminating
government loans would raise productivity by 5.9 percentage points for a fully public enterprise.
Further evidence of the role of the environment is our finding that raising  import penetration by
15 percentage points would increase TFP by 6 percentage points for a fully public enterprise.
The results in Table 6 therefore indicate that the negative impact of ownership in Indonesia
operates through the environmental factors of soft loans and import protection.  While soft loans
do not have a negative effect on private firms, they significantly reduce the productivity of public
enterprises.  In addition, import protection has a more detrimental effect on public firms
compared to those in the private sector." 6 Public sector enterprises in Indonesia appear to be
more prone to poor performance if soft loans and/or import protection are available.
It is also true that, given the same amount of competition, public sector firms are less productive
than their private sector counterparts.
E.  Effects of Other Variables
As predicted, if a firm uses the stock exchange as a source of investment funding, it is
more efficient.  This holds for the first difference and the within models, although the effect is
not significant. Increases in foreign ownership are associated with higher productivity growth,
but the coefficient on FOREIGN becomes insignificant when we add other controls. However,
6This  result is quite  possibly  picking  up the fact  that public  sector  enterprises  receive  special  protection  from
import  competition,  leading  to differential  effects  of opening  up to outside  competition  on public  versus  private
enterprises.
29partnerships between public and foreign enterprises do have a positive impact on efficiency.7
This effect is significant across all specifications.  One policy implication is that govemrnents
reluctant to privatize could improve efficiency in the public sector by finding them foreign
partners.
The Herfindahl index is negative and significant in the within specification, indicating
that in Indonesia firms in more concentrated industries are less productive.  The coefficient on
lagged import penetration is also positive and sometimes significant, indicating that enterprises
in sectors with import competition are more efficient.  GIFTS are positive and significant.
consistent with the predictions of the Shleifer/Vishny model.  Although one alternative
interpretation of the positive and significant coefficient on GIFTS is that bribery pays, the results
are consistent with our earlier results pointing to a significant negative relationship between gift-
giving and excess employment. Finally, JAVA, a proxy for the politician's  relative bargaining
power, is negative and generally significant, as predicted by the SV model.  One alternative
interpretation, which we cannot rule out, is that the JAVA dummy is picking up congestion
effects on productivity.
F.  Endogeneity of Ownership and Government Loans
It could be argued that our findings that public ownership and soft loans reduce efficiency
may reflect reverse causality, i.e. that more efficient public sector firms are selected for
privatization and that government loans are essentially bail-outs given to failing enterprises.  We
7We  argue that foreign  ownership  is a good proxy  for the manager's  disagreement  point  and that enterprises
with  foreign  ownership  should have  less  excess  employment.
30consider whether this argument is correct by using two approaches which are described below.
1. Comparing Pre and Post-Privatization Performance
We examine the pre and post-privatization performance of privatized firms compared to
firms with no change in ownership and the pre-and-post receipt of government loans
performance for public sector firms that received these loans compared to public sector firms that
did not.  The results are shown in Table 7  where selection for government loans is examined in
Panel A and selection into privatization is examined in Panel B.  Panel A shows that in the three
years prior to receipt of government loans, those public sector firms that receive the loans are not
performing worse relative to other public sector firms, where performance is measured either as
total factor productivity growth, the log of sales per employee, the change in the log of sales per
employee, cost per unit, or the change in cost per unit. Panel B shows that public sector firms that
are subsequently privatized perform no worse, as measured by total factor productivity growth,
the change in the log of sales per employee, or the change in cost per unit, compared to firms
with no change in ownership.  It is true that, consistent with the predictions of the Ehrlich
et.al.(1994) framework, the privatized firms have higher levels of productivity as measured by
the log of sales per employee or cost per unit.  However, their growth rates are not significantly
different from plants with no change in ownership.  The results in Table 7 suggest that selection
is not responsible for the findings in Table 6 that both ownership and environment are
responsible for the observed inferior performance of publicly owned manufacturing enterprises in
Indonesia.  There is no evidence that poor performers were subsequently bailed out with
government loans.  Nor is there any evidence that privatizing firms were selected on the basis of
unusually good or bad previous performance, which could lead to under or over-estimating the
31gains from privatization.
2. Instrumental Variable Estimates
We also  re-estimated the productivity equations using an instrumental variables (IV)
approach for both the first differences and the within specifications.  Our focus is on the
endogeneity of GLOAN; we assume that changes in ownership are exogenously determined.
This assumption seems plausible both in light of the results in Table 6 as well as the fact that
many firms were privatized as part of an overall mandate to deregulate the Indonesian economy.
For the first differences IV specification, instruments for GLOAN are:  the second lag of
GLOAN, the lag of SKILLED, the lag of  PUB*GLOAN, the lag of SKILLED * the lag of PUB,
the lag of UNSKILLED* the lag of PUB, the lag of MATERIALS *the lag of PUB, the lag of
CAPITAL*the lag of PUB, the second lag of CAPITAL * the lag of PUB, the lag of PUB, the lag
of GIFT, and the lag of FOR.  The results are shown in columns (2) and (4) of  Table 8.  For the
within IV specification, we use a Helmert transformation whereby we subtract from each t-1
observation the mean of the remaining future observations available in the sample.  This
approach, which is described in Arellano and Bover (1995), allows us to legitimately use lags of
levels as instruments in the within specification, since in a standard within transfornation,  lags
of levels could be correlated with the errors.  The instruments for GLOAN used in the within
specification are: lagged GLOAN*PUB, lagged SKILLED *PUB. lagged CAPITAL*PUB,
lagged GIFTS*PUB, and the lags of GIFTS, FOREIGN and GLOAN..  The IV results using
for-ward  mean deviations are shown in columns (6) and (8).
A comparison of the OLS and IV estimates in the first four columns of Table 8 suggests
that the coefficient on GLOAN*PUB is stable across specifications.  Allowing for endogeneity of
32GLOAN does not change either the point estimates or statistical significance.  The results for the
forward mean deviations are presented in the last four columns. Using forward mean deviations,
the coefficient on PUB*GLOAN becomes statistically insignificant in the IV specifications.  The
point estimates, however, are similar to the ordinary least squares estimates (compare column (5)
to column (6) and column (7) to column (8)).  For all specifications, our Chi-Square tests of the
validity of the excess instruments suggest our instruments are valid.  We cannot reject the
hypothesis that OLS and IV point estimates are the same, and conclude from Table 8 that there is
no clear pattern of loan allocation which reflects bail-outs. 18
C. Extensions
In addition to the alternative specifications discussed above, we also experimented with a
number of other extensions, each of which did not alter the results in Table 6.  First, we redefined
government loans as the real value of goverrnment  loans, instead of normalizing by investment.
This captures the possibility that a firm with a high degree of government subsidy via loans
might not appear to be heavily subsidized if investment is also high.  Our results were unaffected,
although the interpretation of the coefficient on GLOAN changes.  Second, we used a two-step
approach for estimating TFP in which we first estimated sector-specific production functions and
then calculated TFP growth as the residual by subtracting coefficient-weighted changes in inputs
from output growth.  We then regressed total factor productivity growth on all variables except
the inputs and obtained results that are very similar to those reported in Table 6.  Third, we
estimated the equations in Table 6 by three-digit subsector.  To the extent that factor shares or
18 But  the lack  of significance  of the IV results  indicates  the difficulty  in achieving  efficiency  with  this approach.
33mark-ups vary across sectors, the framework presented in equations (I )-(10) would justify
presenting separate estimates by sector.  Although many coefficients are insignificant due to
small sample sizes, the sector-level results (not shown) are consistent with the aggregate results--
particularly in sectors where there are enough observations with positive public ownership.
Fourth, we considered the possibility that the coefficient on the PUB*GLOAN interaction termn  is
capturing a nonlinear quadratic effect of ownership.  This would be the case if GLOAN is highly
collinear with PUB and simply acting as a proxy for public ownership.  We tested for this by
adding the square of PUB to the regressions and the results were unaffected.  Finally, we
considered the possibility that government loans are being used for purposes other than hiring
labor -such as increasing capital intensity.  We tested for this possibility by interacting GLOAN
with capital inputs, which would allow the coefficient on capital to vary with the amount of
government loans and our original results were unchanged.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we disentangle the sources of public sector inefficiency using a 1981-1995
panel data set of all public and private manufacturing firms in Indonesia. We consider two
leading hypotheses: (1) public sector enterprises are inefficient due to monitoring problems and
(2) public sector enterprises are inefficient because of the environment in which they operate, as
measured by the soft budget constraint or barriers to competition.  We nest the two models in a
production function framework and show that if the first model is correct, then public sector
ownership will be associated with lower productivity growth.  The second model implies that
34different types of ownership have no association with productivity; what matters is whether
enterprises receive government subsidies in return for hiring excess labor.
The empirical results, which are obtained from fixed effects specifications, provide
support for both models.  Although we find that public ownership by itself has no independent
negative impact on either productivity level or productivity growth, ownership matters in
Indonesia, because, for a given level of soft loans or import competition, public sector enterprises
perform worse than their private sector counterparts.  The environment matters because only
those public sector enterprises which received loans from state banks or those shielded from
import competition performed worse than private enterprises.  Eliminating soft loans to public
enterprises in Indonesia would raise total factor productivity by 6 percentage points; the same
result could be achieved by increasing import penetration by 15 percentage points. We show that
these findings are not due to selection effects for either privatization or the receipt of soft loans.
Interestingly, private Indonesian firms that receive government loans did not perform more
poorly than other private sector enterprises.
These results suggest that two different types of policies could be used to increase the
efficiency of public sector enterprises in Indonesia or in other countries to which these results
might generalize. Since private firms in Indonesia outperform public sector firms for a given
degree of competition, simply privatizing the firms should lead to gains in efficiency.  But the
results also demonstrate that an alternative way to achieve efficiency gains is to manipulate the
environment, specifically to eliminate soft loans to public enterprises and/or to increase import
competition for these firms.  These are alternative policy options which can be evaluated for their
appropriateness in other countries.
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37Table I
Summary Statistics
% of Investment  Percentage  of Rupiah  % of Firms  % of Total Output  Ratio of Public  # of observations Financed by  Amount  of Gov't Loans  Receiving  Gov't  Accounted  For By  To Private  with Non-Missing Year  Gov't Loans  Allocated  to Public Sector  Loans  Public Sector  Gov't Loans
Enterprises
# of Skilled To All Plants  Public  Private  Public  Private  Age  Size  Unskilled  Public  Private 1981  2.9%  31.8%  1.4%  79.1%  32.7%  1.5%  14.4%  2.1  4.0  3.0  178  3,494 1983  3.6  30.3  2.5  82.6  28.3  2.9  17.3  2.1  5.3  2.8  165  3,766 1985  3.0  30.7  1.8  80.2  28.4  2.2  17.3  2.4  6.0  2.8  261  6,211 1987  2.7  27.9  1.7  89.4  26.4  2.0  17.8  2.3  6.3  3.1  256  6,704 1989  3.3  31.6  2.3  70.9  26.5  2.3  18.2  2.3  7.0  2.9  246  6,997 1993  2.0  31.0  1.2  91.8  16.5  1.1  13.7  2.0  5.8  3.8  82  3,260 1995  1.7  22.7  1.2  95.7  13.6  1.0  13.3  1.8  5.4  2.8  80  2,985
38Table 2
Percentage  of  Percentage  of  Percentage  of Investment
Output  Output  Financed by Government  Loans
Produced  by  Produced  by  (All Years)
each Sector  Public Sector
Enterprises
(All Years)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
ISIC  Code  Public Sector  Private Sector
311 Food Products  9.8%  23.7%  46.9%  1.7%
312 Food Products, NEL  2.7%  4.6%  22.9%  1.7%
313 Beverages  0.8%  8.0%  0  0.9%
314 Tobacco  10.9%  0.2%  16.3%  6.6%
321 Textiles  12.3%  5.7%  23.5%  1.7%
322 Apparel  1.8%  0.2%  20.6%  2.8%
323 Leather Products  0.3%  1.9%  40.0%  0.6%
324 Footwear  0.8%  0.6%  18.4%  1.1%
331 Wood Products  11.0%  2.1%  18.4%  1.7%
332 Furniture  0.4%  1.0%  0%  1.3%
341 Paper Products  2.8%  17.8%  28.0%  1.1%
342 Printing,  Publishing  0.9%  7.1%  33.4%  1.6%
351 Industrial Chemicals  5.3%  50.5%  22.1%  1.8%
352 Other Chemicals  5.1%  2.0%  39.8%  0.7%
354 Petroleum Products  0.0%  - - -
355 Rubber Products  4.8%  7.1%  38.7%  2.2%
356 Plastic Products  2.4%  0.1%  3.7%  0.8%
361 Pottery and China  0.4%  1.5%  3.8%  1.2%
362 Glass Products  0.5%  11.1%  0  2.0%
369 Non-Metal Products  0.2%  5.3%  17.8%  1.3%
371 Iron&Steel  7.6%  62.1%  39.1%  3.7%
372 Non-Ferrous Metals  1.3%  46.1%  21.5%  0
381 Metal Products  4.1%  11.6%  19.4%  1.2%
382 Machinery, NEL  1.1%  14.0%  31.2%  0.8%
383 Electrical  Machinery  4.0%  10.0%  23.0%  0.7%
384 Transport Equipment  5.7%  9.4%  37.7%  1.9%
385 Professional  Equipment  0.1%  0.3%  0  1.4%
390 Other Industries  2.9%  0.2%  0  1.3%
39Table 3
Means For Labor  Share Across Categories
No  Some
Government  Loans  Govermnent  Loans
(Loans  >0)
(1)  (2)
No Public  Ownership
Labor  Share  .18  .15
Labor  Share Normalized  by Sector  .95  .80
Mean
Some Public  Ownership
Labor Share  .20  .20
Labor Share  Normalized  by Sector  1.09  1.14
Mean
Notes: Labor Share is equal to total expenses  on both skilled and unskilled labor, divided by sales. The
Normalized labor  share is divided by the 3-digit sector mean for each year.
40Table 4
Correlations  Between  Labor  Share And Government Loans
No Public  Sector  Ownership
Change in  Change  in
Govemrnment  Loans  Change in  Labor Share  Normalized
As % of Investment  Labor Share  by Sector Mean
Change in Government  Loans
as % of Investment  1.0
Change in Labor Share  -.01  1.0
Change  in Labor Share  .00  94*  1.0
Normalized  by Sector Mean
Some Public Sector  Ownership
Change in Government  Change in Labor Share
Loans as % of  Change  Normalized  by Sector
Investment  in Labor Share  Mean
Change in Government  Loans
as % of Investment  1.0
Change in Labor Share  .08*  1.0
Change  in Labor  Share  .09*  .96*  1.0
Normalized  by Sector  Mean
Notes: See definitions  for Table 4.  A "*" indicates  statistically  significant  at the 1% level.
41Table 5
Dependent  Variable: Labor  Share Normalized  by Sectoral Mean
1981-1993  1981-1995
Levels  First Differences  Levels  First Differences
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
% Public  Ownership  -.774  .138  -.051  -.209
(PUB)  (-2.5)  (0.9)  (0.0)  (-1.3)
Gov't LoarAs  as % of  -.248  -.008  -.213  -.015
Investment  (GLOAN)  (-10.6)  (-0.3)  (-10.9)  (-0.7)
Gifts  -.036  -.008  -.035  -.007
(-29.5)  (-5.3)  (-34.7)  (-5.2)
Foreign  Ownership  -.004  .001  -.004  .000
(FOR)  (-20.7)  (1.1)  (-21.6)  (0.0)
Herfindahl  Index  .332  .037  .253  .102
(HERF)  (7.3)  (0.5)  (7.3)  (1.6)
Import  Penetration  -,  .002  .016
(MPEN)  (0.0)  (0.2)
Java Dumrny  -.024  .018  -.040  .015
(-2.4)  (0.2)  (-5.1)  (0.4)
PUB * GLOAN  .274  .193  .272  .156
(4.4)  (3.2)  (4.9)  (2.9)
PUB * GIFTS  .020  .011  .019  .017
(2.6)  (1.3)  (3.1)  (2.2)
PUB * FOR  -.009  -.006  -.009  -.004
(-3.7)  (-.8)  (-3.6)  (-0.7)
PUB * HERF  -1.126  .156  -.833  .243
(-3.4)  (0.5)  (-3.3)  (1.0)
PUB * MPEN  -.532  -1.285  - -
(-1.2)  (-3.2)
PUB * JAVA  .075  -.414  .127  -.113
(1.2)  (-1.8)  (2.5)  (-0.6)
Number of Observations  45,101  27,487  66,840  39,920
R-Square  .04  .04  .04  .01
Notes: T-Values in parentheses. Standard  errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  All Specifications  include year and
sector  (ISIC) dummies,  as well as PUB interacted  with year end SIC  dummies  to allow for differences across ownership
status.
42Table 6
Impact  of Ownership  and the Soft Budget
Constraint  on Productivity:  First Differences  and Within  Estimation
Dependent  Variable: Log Change in Real Output or Log Deviation  from Log Mean of Output
First Differences  Within Estimation
1982-1995  1982-1993  1981-95  1981-1993
(I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
PUB  .004  0.559  .799  .411  .016  -.184
(0.1)  (1.0)  (1.2)  (0.5)  (0.1)  (-0.5)
PUB*T  - -.006  -.009  -.005  -.001  .002
(-1.0)  (-1.2)  (-0.6)  (-0.6)  (0.4)
GLOAN  - - .020  .004  .013  .006
(1.0)  (0.2)  (0.8)  (0.3)
GLOAN*PUB  - - -.066  -.062  -.060  -.065
(-2.2)  (1.8)  (-2.2)  (-2.0)
SKILLED  .069  .069  .081  .078  .071  .072
(14.2)  (14.1)  (12.5)  (9.9)  (21.5)  (16.8)
UNSKILLED  .192  .192  .175  .176  .200  .198
(23.5)  (23.4)  (16.9)  (14.1)  (40.4)  (30.1)
MATERIALS  .624  .624  .612  .592  .671  .664
(81.2)  (81.2)  (59.4)  (51.5)  (234.3)  (180.8)
CAPITAL  .003  .003  .003  .003  .023  .016
(4.4)  (4.4)  (3.3)  (2.9)  (11.1)  (6.3)
FOREIGN  .001  .001  .001  .000  .001  0.0
(2.0)  (2.0)  (0.8)  (0.4)  (1.9)  (-0.4)
HERFt,  - - - -.028  -.059  -.087
(-0.4)  (-2.0)  (-2.0)
STOCK  - - - .029  .012  .046
(1.0)  (1.0)  (2.3)
MPEN,-,  - - - .038  - .077
(0.6)  (1.8)
GIFTS  - - - .005  .006  .006
(3.9)  (7.7)  (6.7)
JAVA  - - - -.161  -.143  -.245
(-.8)  (-3,7)  (-2.8)
PUB*HERF  - - - -.031  .128  .153
(-0.1)  (1.1)  (I.1)
PUB*PEN  - - - .553  - .332
(2.8)  (2.3)
PUB*FOR  - - - .025  .014  .021
(2.2)  (3.2)  (3.5)
PUB*JAVA  - - - -.019  .058  -.143
(-0.  1)  (0.7)  (-1.1)
R-Square  .65  .65  .62  .59  .80  .78
Number of Observations  30.698  30.698  19,098  14.208  36.922  25.622
Notes: T-Values in parentheses. Standard  errors are corrected  for heteroskedesticity.  All specifications  include year and ISIC
dummies. The change in the capital stock is proxied by investment  for first differences  Specification.
43Table 7
Relative Performance Pre-and-Post  Receipt  of Government  Loans and Privatization
3 Years Prior  2 Years  Prior  I Year  Prior  I Year After
A.  Loans (control group  is public sector enterprises  without loans)
TFP Growth  -.091  -.079  -.031  .052
(2.5)  (1.2)  (0.7)  (1.6)
Log (Sales/Employee)  .014  -.008  -.002  .002
(1.2)  (0.5)  (0.2)  (0.2)
Change in Log (Sales//employee)  -.006  -.008  .002  .001
(1.2)  (0.9)  (0.4)  (0.2)
Cost Per Unit  -.050  -.008  -.020  -.023
(2.1)  (0.2)  (0.9)  (I. 1)
Change in Cost Per Unit  .022  .028  .023  .000
(1.0)  (0.9)  (I. 1)  (0.0)
B.  Privatization  (control group is plants with no change  in ownership)
TFP Growvth  .065  .018  .028  -.024
(1.5)  (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.6)
Log (Sales/Employee)  .092  .087  .070  .045
(6.5)  (6.9)  (6.6)  (3.5)
Change in Log (Sales/Employee)  .001  .002  .011  -.003
(0.2)  (0.2)  (1.8)  (0.4)
Cost Per Unit  -.105  -.101  -.087  -.086
(4.5)  (4.8)  (5.0)  (4.1)
Change in Cost Per Unit  -.003  .004  -.014  -.010
(0.2)  (0.2)  (0.8)  (0.5)
Notes: T-Value for test of differences  in means in ().  Values  indicate differences  between plants and
control group.  For all values other than TFP growth, values are normalized by sector means. Therefore
a value of .014 for Log (Sales/Employee)  indicates that firrns receiving loans had higher sales per
employee (relative to sector mean) of 1.4%.  See definition for Cost Per Unit in Table  1.
44Table 8
Impact  of Ownership  and the Soft Budget Constraint  on Productivity:
First difference  OLS, IV, and Forward  Deviation  from Means Estimates.
Dependent  Variable:  Log Change in Real Output  or Deviation  from Mean Log Output
First Differences  Forward Deviations  from Means
1982-1993  1982-1995  1981-1993  1981-1995
OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
PUB  -.677  -.670  -.388  -.036  -.235  -.407  .008  -.186
(-0.6)  (-0.6)  (-0.4)  (0.0)  (-0.4)  (-0.7)  (0.0)  (-0.4)
PUB*T  .009  .008  .007  .003  .002  .004  -.001  .001
(0.7)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.3)  (0.4)  (0.7)  (-0.3)  (0.2)
GLOAN  .044  -.041  .048  .038  .027  .183  .042  .166
(1.5)  (-0.6)  (1.8)  (0.6)  (0.9)  (1.7)  (1.7)  (1.6)
GLOAN*PUB  -.132  -.131  -.113  -.226  -.086  -.083  -.101  -.088
(-3.0)  (-1.2)  (-2.8)  (-2.4)  (-2.1)  (-0.5)  (-2.7)  (-0.5)
SKILLED  .078  .078  076  075  .080  .080  .081  .081
(7.0)  (6.9)  (8.4)  (8.3)  (9.7)  (9.6)  (11.2)  (11.2)
UNSKILLED  .179  .181  .178  .180  .214  .213  .207  .207
(9.7)  (9.7)  (11.8)  (11.9)  (17.2)  (17.1)  (18.5)  (18.5)
MATERIALS  .560  .560  .574  .573  .637  .637  .641  .641
(30.4)  (30.4)  (34.6)  (34.6)  (57.7)  (57.7)  (63.5)  (63.4)
CAPITAL  .004  .004  .004  .004  .019  .019  .019  .018
(3.0)  (3.0)  (3.5)  (3.5)  (6.4)  (6.2)  (6.7)  (6.6)
FOREIGN  .001  .0004  .001  .001  .001  .001  .001  .001
(0.9)  (0.9)  (1.3)  (1.3)  (2.0)  (2.0)  (2.1)  (2.1)
HERF-I,  -.183  -.180  -.083  -.082  -.078  -.082  -.050  -.053
(-2.1)  (-2.0)  (-1.4)  (-1.4)  (-1.4)  (-1.5)  (-1.0)  (-1.  1)
STOCK  .041  .040  .044  .044  .004  005  .005  .006
(1.  1)  (1.  1)  (1.9)  (1.9)  (0.2)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)
MPEN,  .070  .068  - - -.060  -.061  - -
(0.9)  (0.9)  (-2.2)  (-2.2)
GIFTS  .003  .002  .002  .002  .004  .004  .004  .004
(1.5)  (1.5)  (1.4)  (1.4)  (3.4)  (3.3)  (3.3)  (3.3)
JAVA  -.454  -.456  -.089  -.087  - 167  -.159  -.186  -.182
(-3.6)  (-3.6)  (-0.6)  (-0.6)  (-2.3)  (-2.2)  (-2.7)  (-2.6)
PUB*HERF  -.286  -.226  -.554  -.497  .381  .376  .293  .289
(-0.7)  (-0.6)  (-2.1)  (-1.9)  (1.9)  (1.8)  (1.4)  (1.4)
PUB*PEN  .404  .476  - - .018  .011  - -
(1.9)  (2.1)  (0.4)  (0.2)
PUB*FOR  .031  .030  .035  .034  .020  .020  .018  .018
(2.5)  (2.4)  (3.1)  (3.0)  (2.7)  (2.7)  (2.5)  (2.5)
PUB*JAVA  -.165  -.124  -.186  -.182  -.142  -.176  -.024  -.050
(-05)  (-04)  (-  1  1)  (-1 0)  (-0.9)  (- 1.1)  (-02)  (-04)
R-Square  .54  .54  .57  .56  .74  .74  .74  .74
Number of Observations  7.487  7.487  9.889  9.889  11.074  11.074  13.730  13,730
Chi-Square  Value  - 3.0  - 3.0  - 10.0  - 12.4
for Over-identification  Test
Notes: T-Values in parentheses. Standard  errors  are corrected for heteroskedesticity.  All Specifications  include year and ISIC
dummies. All variables in columns  (1) through (4) are in first differences,  while all variables in columns (5) through (8) are
deviation from plant means. In the first differences  specification.  instruments  for GLOAN include the lag of SKILLED.  the lag
of PUB*GLOAN,  the lag of  SKILLED*  the lag of PUB. the lag of first differences  UNSKILLED*  the lag of PUB. the lag of
MATERIALS*  the lag of PUB.  the lag CAPITAL*  the lag of PUB, the second lag of CAPITAL*  the lag of PUB. the second lag
of GLOAN.  the lag of  PUB, the lag of GIFT, and the lag of FOR. For the forward mean deviations,  the following  were used to
instrument  GLOAN  and PUB*GLOAN:  lagged  PUBGL.  lagged  skill*PUB, lagged  capital*PUB,  lagged  GIFTS*PUB.  and the
lag of GIFTS. FOREIGN.  and GLOAN.
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